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NOTES
Use of Juror Depositions to Bar




On November 29, 1979, in Katz v. Eli Lilly & Co.," Judge Ed-
ward R. Neaher of the Eastern District of New York ruled that Eli
Lilly, the defendant in a federal "DES daughter" action for wrong-
ful death, was entitled to depose the jurors from a prior state court
case against it in order to demonstrate that those jurors had ar-
rived at a compromise verdict. By showing that the jury had
reached its verdict through compromise, the defendant blocked the
use of collateral estoppel by the plaintiff in the federal action.
Katz is thus one of the latest in a long series of decisions that have
altered the application of collateral estoppel or, as it is sometimes
known, issue preclusion.2 The Katz decision, however, marks the
first time a judge has allowed such a detailed inquiry into the
mental processes of a jury for the purpose of determining whether
the requirements for the use of collateral estoppel have been satis-
fied.3 Furthermore, Judge Neaher's ruling raises many questions
concerning the extent to which one can use depositions for this
purpose and the problems that can arise with their use. For exam-
ple, would depositions still be appropriate if one or more of the
jurors in the previous trial had died? What validity should the
court give to such depositions if some of the jurors disagree with
others as to what occurred in the decisionmaking process, or if only
one juror disagrees with all the others? What steps should a court
take if the jurors refuse to be deposed? Should judges also be sub-
ject to investigation concerning the basis for their decisions in pre-
1. 84 F.R.D. 378 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
2. See generally notes 16-50 infra and accompanying text.
3. See Katz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 84 F.R.D. 378 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
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vious trials? Finally, how do the Katz decision and its various
ramifications relate to the continuing abrogation of the mutuality
requirement?
This Note initially discusses the doctrine of collateral estoppel
and its policy justifications. Next, it describes the mutuality re-
quirement for the use of collateral estoppel, tracing the abandon-
ment of the mutuality rule by an increasing number of courts and
presenting the policy arguments for and against such abandon-
ment. Then the Note turns to the three corollaries of the collateral
estoppel theory and explores the different methods that parties
may use to establish each one. The Note also discusses the possi-
bility that those methods may conflict with the basic policy of pre-
serving the privacy and inviolability of the jury system. Finally,
the Note considers the various problems posed by Katz, including
the relationship of those problems to the judicial abrogation of the
mutuality requirement.
II. THE THEORY OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
A. Definition and Policy
In Cromwell v. County of Sac,' an 1876 case, the United
States Supreme Court defined the theory of collateral estoppel and
distinguished it from the related concept of res judicata. Res judi-
cata precludes a second action when it involves the same cause of
action between the same parties in a prior lawsuit. Res judicata
affects any cause of action that was actually presented in the first
action or that should have been presented in the first action.5 On
the other hand, when the second case involves a different cause of
action, the doctrine of collateral estoppel operates to preclude de-
liberation as to any issue upon which a judge or jury actually based
a finding or verdict in the first action.6 Offensive, or affirmative,
4. 94 U.S. 351 (1876).
5. Id. at 352-53. Res judicata involves two concepts known as merger and bar:
The term "merger" is used to describe the effect of a judgment in plaintiff's favor.
Such a judgment extinguishes the entire claim or cause of action which was the subject
of the former action and merges it in the judgment .... Plaintiff may no longer sue
on the original cause of action or any item thereof even if that item was omitted from
the original action.
The term "bar" is used to describe the effect of a judgment on the merits for the
defendant. Such a judgment extinguishes the entire cause of action or claim which was
the subject of the action in which the judgment was rendered, including items of that
claim which were not in fact raised in the former action.
F. JAMES, CivI. PocaDuE § 11.9 (1965).
6. 94 U.S. at 350-51.
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application of collateral estoppel is the use of a prior judgment by
a plaintiff in order to establish some point against the defendant.
Defensive use of collateral estoppel involves the use of a judgment
by a defendant to prevent litigation on some particular issue raised
by the plaintiff.7 Unlike res judicata, collateral estoppel concerns
only issues that were actually raised and determined in the first
action.8
Because collateral estoppel does not apply to issues not liti-
gated and determined in a former action, three corollaries of collat-
eral estoppel have arisen.' In order to satisfy these corollaries, the
party seeking the benefit of collateral estoppel must show that dur-
ing the former action the presently contested issue was actually
litigated, 10 finally determined by the judicial tribunal," and neces-
sarily so determined. 12
The requirement that the relevant issue actually have been lit-
igated in the prior case means that a party may raise a previously
omitted point in later contexts. This corollary operates as a recog-
nition that the situations in which collateral estoppel may arise are
7. Katz is an example of the attempted use of offensive collateral estoppel. Plaintiff
wanted to use a prior judgment against Eli Lilly as proof of the defectiveness of its product,
DES. If collateral estoppel had applied, plaintiff would not have had to litigate the issue of
defectiveness. See 84 F.R.D. at 381. For a discussion of offensive and defensive application
of collateral estoppel, see M. GRnxN, BAsic Cim PROCEDURE 218-22 (1972).
8. F. JAmEs & G. HAZARD, CrvIL PRocEDuRE 563 (2d ed. 1977). The authors point out
that many legal scholars now refer to collateral estoppel as "issue preclusion." In addition,
collateral estoppel applies only to issues of fact, McGrath v. Gold, 36 N.Y.2d 406, 411, 330
N.E.2d 35, 37, 369 N.Y.S.2d 62, 65 (1975), although it may be invoked for mixed questions
of law and fact, People v. Plevy, 67 A.D.2d 591, 595 n.3, 416 N.Y.S.2d 41, 44 n.3 (1979).
9. F. JAmzs & G. HAzAR, supra note 8, at 563-64. See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife v.
Andrus, 77 F.R.D. 448, 453 (D.D.C. 1978).
10. E.g., Russell v. Place, 94 U.S. 606 (1876); Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 77
F.R.D. 448, 453 (D.D.C. 1978).
11. E.g., 77 F.R.D. 448, 453 (D.D.C. 1978); see F. JAmzs & G. HAzARD, supra note 8, at
563-64.
12. E.g., Rios v. Davis, 373 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963). See also Patterson v.
Saunders, 194 Va. 607, 74 S.E.2d 204 (1953)(judgment in a case involving two or more issues
is conclusive as to all the issues when all are decided in favor of same party and the judg-
ment rests upon them jointly, since the decision of one issue in such case is no less necessary
or material than the decision of the other).
Some courts and legal scholars have presented a slightly different group of corollaries;
they require that the party seeking to use collateral estoppel establish the following points:
first, that the issue in the two cases is identical; second, that the issue was actually litigated
in the first action; third, that the issue was necessary to the first judgment; and last, that
the application of collateral estoppel would be fair. Once that burden is met, the other party
must demonstrate that he did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in
order to avoid the application of collateral estoppel. See Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24
N.Y.2d 65, 246 N.E.2d 725, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1969); Kroll, Principles of Collateral Estop-
pel in Products Liability, 1979 INs. L.J. 313, 314-15.
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variable and extremely difficult to predict; therefore, there should
not be undue pressure to litigate every conceivable issue in any one
case in order to avoid being estopped from litigating it in a subse-
quent case."3 The requirement that the determination of the issue
was necessary to the result is a recognition of the fact that the
parties, the judge, and/or the jury are all more likely to have fo-
cused time and effort on the necessary points. Furthermore, un-
necessary findings are usually not appealable.1 4 Thus, collateral es-
toppel is not simply a weapon or a shield that functions whenever
a party satisfies certain mechanical tests. Because collateral estop-
pel involves considerations of fairness and close scrutiny of both
actions, courts have exercised a great deal of discretion in attempt-
ing to apply collateral estoppel justly.1 5
B. Mutuality
One area of collateral estoppel in which courts traditionally
exercised little or no discretion was the requirement of mutuality26
In order to satisfy the mutuality requirement, the opposing parties
in the second action must be the same as, or in privity with, the
parties in the first action.17 Due process has been the standard ra-
13. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 8, at 564-65.
14. Id. at 570. An example of a determination not being necessary to a final judgment
arises when one party is sued for negligence in relation to an automobile accident and in
turn counterclaims against the plaintiff for contributory negligence. If the result is a verdict
for the defendant, a determination that the defendant was not negligent is not necessary to
that result. Therefore, the issue of the defendant's negligence is not precluded in later ac-
tions involving that accident.
15. See Kroll, supra note 12, at 327. The twin policies of protecting the same litigants
from having to relitigate the same issues and of protecting the public from excessive litiga-
tion underlie both collateral estoppel and res judicata. 1B MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTIcE 1
0.41211] at 1809 (2d ed. 1948).
16. Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 225 U.S. 111 (1912); Suggs v. Alabama
Power Co., 271 Ala. 168, 123 So. 2d 4 (1960); Spettigue v. Mahoney, 8 Ariz. App. 281, 445
P.2d 557 (1968); Adamson v. Hill, 202 Kan. 482, 449 P.2d 536 (1969); Stillpass v. Kenton
County Airport Bd., Inc., 403 S.W.2d 46 (Ky. 1966); Shaw v. Eaves, 262 N.C. 656, 138 S.E.2d
520 (1964); Raz v. Mills, 233 Or. 452, 378 P.2d 959 (1963); Booth v. Kirk, 53 Tenn. App. 139,
381 S.W.2d 312 (1963); Swilley v. McCain, 374 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. 1964).
17. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 8, at 575-76. Generally there are two types
of privity that satisfy the mutuality requirement. In the first situation, a nonparty to the
prior action was represented in that action by someone authorized to act in his behalf. The
second type of privity occurs when the legal rights of a nonparty to the first action were so
defined that their survival depended on the outcome of the prior action. Id. For a discussion
of collateral estoppel, mutuality, and privity, see Berch, A Proposal to Permit Collateral
Estoppel of Nonparties Seeking Affirmative Relief, 1979 ARiz. ST. L.J. 511, 512-17. The
author emphasizes the point that privity involves more than simply a similar interest in the
subject matter.
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tionale for the mutuality requirement, the argument being that
any determination of a factual issue against a person who lacked
an opportunity to argue that issue in court violated his constitu-
tional rights.18 Despite its constitutional grounds, however, mutu-
ality has been the target of criticism by legal scholars, judges, and
lawyers for many years. For example, in the early nineteenth cen-
tury Jeremy Bentham wrote of the mutuality requirement:
There is a reason for saying that a man shall not lose his cause in conse-
quence of the verdict given in a former proceeding to which he was not a
party; but there is no reason whatever for saying that he shall not lose his
cause in consequence of the verdict in a proceeding to which he was a party,
merely because his adversary was not. It is ... the very height of absurdity."
Exceptions to the doctrines of collateral estoppel and of mutu-
ality developed gradually, because of the problems arising from a
rigid mutuality requirement. For instance, a nominal party who is
named as a party-plaintiff or a party-defendant, yet who has no
control over the litigation, cannot be bound by a judgment in the
case. 0 On the other hand, a person who is not named as a party,
but who "vouches in" and assumes control because he has a mone-
tary interest in the outcome of the litigation, will not be allowed in
a subsequent case to try factual issues that were actually litigated
and necessarily determined. This situation is known as the indem-
nitor/indemnitee exception.2 1 Generally, courts have long recog-
nized exceptions to the mutuality requirement in cases in which
the defendants have a principal/agent, master/servant, or indemni-
tee/indemnitor relationship."
In the last forty years, however, an increasing number of juris-
dictions have not been content merely to carve out exceptions to
the doctrine of mutuality in very limited situations, but have
18. See F. JAMEs & G. HAZARD, supra note 8, at 575. See also Ashe v. Swenson, 397
U.S. 436 (1970); Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Newport, 247 U.S. 464, 476 (1918). But see Gerrard
v. Larsen, 517 F.2d 1127 (8th Cir. 1975); Roode v. Michaelian, 373 F. Supp. 53 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
19. 7 WoRKS or Jwmm BamNmm 171 (Bowring ed. London 1843).
20. See Berch, supra note 17, at 517.
21. Id. at 518. Courts have extended this exception to the situation in which a plaintiff
sues an indemnitor, loses, and then sues the indemnitee. Many courts have not allowed the
suit against the indemnitee, even though it fits within the limits of traditional mutuality,
because otherwise "either the first judgment in the indemnitor's favor would be meaningless
or the indemnitee's valuable right of indemnification would be lost." Furthermore, before
the advent of Rule 23 concerning class actions, some courts sidestepped the mutuality doc-
trine by allowing absentee class members to intervene after a finding in favor of the class.
(Rule 23 now operates both to benefit and to bind absentees). Id. at 519-21.
22. 41 Mo. L. Rzy. 521, 523 (1976).
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openly rejected the doctrine itself, although in varying degrees. In
1942 Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court launched
the initial attack on mutuality in Bernhard v. Bank of America.2
A probate court had determined that the transfer of funds from a
decedent's account to an account managed by a third party was a
gift of the amount of the deposit. Later Helen Bernhard, a benefi-
ciary under the decedent's will, became administratrix of the es-
tate and sued the transferee bank to recover the deposit. The bank
argued that the finding of the probate court precluded any further
litigation on the issue, but Bernhard responded that lack of mutu-
ality prevented this defense because the bank had not been a party
to the previous action.2'
Since the bank had only derivative liability, if any, the court
could have decided the case simply by using one of the mutuality
exceptions. Justice Traynor, however, cut deeply into the applica-
tion of mutuality by holding that a party could utilize collateral
estoppel once three questions were answered affirmatively. First, is
the issue in question identical to the issue in the first action? Sec-
ond, was there a final judgment on the merits of that issue in the
first action? Last, is the party against whom the plea is asserted a
party or in privity with a party to the prior litigation?25 Although
Bernhard involved defensive use of collateral estoppel, Justice
Traynor wrote his opinion broadly enough to encompass both of-
fensive and defensive situations.
Several courts, however, began to develop a number of limita-
tions to the Bernhard decision, the most significant being the limi-
tation of the abrogation of mutuality to defensive use of collateral
estoppel.26 This limitation prevented unsuccessful litigants from
returning to the courtroom simply by switching opponents and
promoted consolidation of litigation at the outset.27 State courts
generally adhered to the defensive use limitation,28 whereas federal
23. 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
24. Id. at 809-10, 122 P.2d at 893-94.
25. Id. at 813, 122 P.2d at 895.
26. See 19 DE PAUL L. REv. 410, 414 (1969). Another limitation employed after the
establishment of the "Bernhard Doctrine" was that of "initiative," which meant that a party
could not be estopped from relitigating an issue in a second action unless he had taken the
initiative in the first suit, regardless of the particular circumstances. Id. at 413. The Califor-
nia Supreme Court, however, soon rejected this limitation. Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Domin-
ion Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 601, 375 P.2d 439 (1962). For a discussion of the initiative limitation
in the period immediately following Bernhard, see Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppe:
Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. Rav. 281, 316-21 (1957).
27. 19 Dz PAuL L. Rav. 410, 413 (1969).
28. Id. at 415-16. See also Standage Ventures, Inc. v. State, 114 Ariz. 480, 562 P.2d
[Vol. 34:143
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courts were more willing to allow nonparties to prior actions to as-
sert the collateral estoppel doctrine offensively.29 Federal courts
then began to apply the "full and fair opportunity" rule, under
which a party could assert collateral estoppel affirmatively or de-
fensively if four criteria were met. First, the party to be estopped
must have had an adequate opportunity to gather and present
depositions and interrogatories in the prior action. Second, the
party to be estopped must have had the opportunity to call wit-
nesses and cross-examine his adversary's witnesses. Third, the
prior action must have been a fair adversary proceeding. Fourth,
there must have been a final determination on the issue in ques-
tion.30 The first state court to adopt the federal "full and fair op-
portunity" rule was the New York Court of Appeals in B.R. De-
Witt, Inc. 'v. Hall.3 1 Although the holding of that case was
restricted to the situation "where the plaintiff in the present action
. . . derives his right to recovery from the plaintiff in the first ac-
tion, ' 3 the court allowed collateral estoppel to be applied offen-
sively. The same court repeated its use of the federal rule a few
years later in Schwartz v. Public Administrator.3 In 1969, how-
ever, another New York state court allowed a nonparty who did
not derive any rights from a party to employ collateral estoppel
affirmatively in a multiple litigant situation in Hart v. American
Airlines, Inc." In fact, most courts that have abandoned the mutu-
360 (1977); Miller v. City of Bakersfield, 256 Cal. App. 2d 820, 64 Cal. Rptr. 469 (1967);
McGary v. Rocky Ford Nat'l Bank, 523 P.2d 479 (Colo. App. 1974); Morneau v. Stark En-
terprises, 56 Hawaii 420, 539 P.2d 472 (1975); Schneberger v. United States Fidelity & Guar.
Co., 213 N.W.2d 913 (Iowa 1973); Home Owners Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Northwestern
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 354 Mass. 448, 238 N.E.2d 55 (1968); Gerhardt v. Miller, 532 S.W.2d
852 (Mo. App. 1975); Lougee v. Beres, 113 N.H. 712, 313 A.2d 422 (1973); Anco Mfg. &
Supply Co. v. Swank, 524 P.2d 7 (Okla. 1974); Sample v. Chapman, 7 Wash. App. 129, 497
P.2d 1334 (1972).
29. See, e.g., Maryland ex rel. Gliedman v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 298 (D.
Md. 1967); United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Wash. 1962),
afl'd sub nom. United Air Lines v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.) (issues of res judicata and
mutuality), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964).
30. Maryland ex rel. Gliedman v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 267 F. Supp. at 304.
31. 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967). DeWitt added two ques-
tions to those posed by Justice Traynor. First, does the party against whom collateral estop-
pel is plead have a fair opportunity to present his side? Second, is there any reason, in
equity, that would argue against application of collateral estoppel?
32. Id. at 148, 225 N.E.2d at 199, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 601-02.
33. 24 N.Y.2d 65, 246 N.E.2d 725, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1969).
34. 61 Misc. 2d 41, 304 N.Y.S.2d 810 (Sup. Ct. 1969). Similarly, James and Hazard
discuss the problems of affirmative application of collateral estoppel, yet they conclude that
it is usually fair in the multiple litigant, mass tort cases. See F. JAMES & G. HAzARD, supra
note 8, at 580-82.
19811
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ality rule are now willing to apply collateral estoppel both defen-
sively and offensively, depending completely upon the circum-
stances of each case.35 In this case-by-case analysis, courts examine
such factors as whether the application would achieve anomalous
results;386 whether the amount involved in the first action was sub-
stantially less than that in the second; whether the party asserting
the estoppel was a party in the first action;3 7 whether the litigant
against whom estoppel is claimed had a full and fair opportunity
to present and defend his position;38 whether the necessary iden-
tity of issues exists;3 9 whether the issues were competently, fully,
and fairly litigated previously;40 whether the party against whom
the assertion is made can present any reasonable grounds for deny-
ing collateral estoppel;41 and whether the estoppel assertion is of-
fensive or defensive.42
Several state courts, however, have continued to adhere to the
mutuality requirement. For example, in Spettigue v. Mahoney43
the Arizona Court of Appeals held that plaintiffs who were not
parties or privy to prior litigation were not entitled to the benefit
of that judgment, even though the contentions of liability were ex-
actly the same. In fact, there was a great overlap between evidence
in the two actions when the issue of liability was tried again. The
court pointed out that many factors-such as the selection of the
judge and the jury, the choice of attorneys, the presence of wit-
nesses and the presentation of their testimony, the relationship be-
tween witnesses and the trier of fact, and the choice of forum-can
detract from the truthseeking goal of a trial. The court then con-
cluded that no judgment should be used as the basis for a plea of
collateral estoppel without the protection of the mutuality
requirement.
35. See F. JAMzs & G. HAZARD, supra note 8, at 580-82.
36. Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966) (offensive use denied when defendant had passively
defended first suit because of claim for nominal damages); Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d
944 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964)(offensive use allowed when defendant had
anticipated additional plaintiffs and had litigated fully).
37. Adamson v. Hill, 202 Kan. 482, 449 P.2d 536 (1969).
38. Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973); Thomas v. Consolidated
Coal Co., 380 F.2d 69 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1004 (1967).
39. Pennington v. Snow, 471 P.2d 370 (Alaska 1970).
40. B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967);
Davis v. Nielson, 9 Wash. App. 864, 515 P.2d 995 (1973).
41. 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967).
42. Adamson v. Hill, 202 Kan. 482, 449 P.2d 536 (1969).
43. 8 Ariz. App. 281, 445 P.2d 557 (1968).
150 [Vol. 34:143
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The United States Supreme Court had stated the traditional
mutuality doctrine in 1936 in Triplett v. Lowell,4" but it took a
fresh look at the issue during the decade of the 1970s. In Blonder-
Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation45
the Court reexamined the Triplett rule in the context of patent
litigation, rejecting that rule in favor of abrogation of mutuality in
situations in which the patentee had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate and lost.
The Supreme Court's most recent statement concerning mutu-
ality appeared in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,46 in which stock-
holders attempted to collaterally estop the corporation from reliti-
gating issues resolved against it in a previous SEC suit. The
opinion discusses extensively the differences between offensive and
defensive use of collateral estoppel, with particular emphasis on
the problems associated with offensive application of the doctrine.
Such problems include the encouragement of a "wait and see" atti-
tude47 on the part of potential plaintiffs, the dilemma of a series of
inconsistent verdicts, and the possibility of a difference between
the procedural opportunities provided to the parties in the first
and second forums.4'8 The Court concluded that a case-by-case ap-
proach was the best method of deciding collateral estoppel cases
and thus reiterated its emphasis on a grant of broad discretion to
trial courts. Based upon the Parklane facts, the Courtdecided that
offensive use of collateral estoppel was not unfair, because the
stockholders probably could not have joined in the SEC enforce-
ment action, the SEC decision was not inconsistent with any prior
decisions, the defendants had every incentive to litigate fully the
first time, and there was no difference between procedural oppor-
tunities afforded the litigants, and thus no likelihood of a different
result.4" In addition, the Parklane decision abolished the mutuality
44. 297 U.S. 638 (1936).
45. 402 U.S. 313 (1971). For discussions of the Blonder-Tongue opinion, see Note,
Patents-Collateral Estoppel-Defendant in Patent Infringement Suit May Plead Collat-
eral Estoppel Against Owner Whose Patent Has Been Declared Invalid in Prior Suit
Against Different Defendant, 60 Gao. L.J. 1126 (1972); Note, Patents-Collateral Estop-
pel-Judicial Invalidation of Patent Bars Suit Against Different Infringer, 50 Tax. L. REv.
559 (1972).
46. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
47. For example, if the finding in a prior case is favorable to a potential plaintiff, he
will have greater incentive to bring his own suit; if the result is unfavorable, he will refrain.
In any case, he will be unwilling to join his case with that of other plaintiffs at the outset.
48. 439 U.S. at 329-31.
49. Id. at 331-33. In this case the Supreme Court overruled the trial court's decision,
which was based upon petitioners' seventh amendment right to a jury trial. The Court held'
1981]
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doctrine and replaced it with the full and fair opportunity rule,
another aspect of its case-by-case approach. Thus, the Court lim-
ited the use of collateral estoppel to situations in which it was fair
to the litigants, yet expanded the notion to situations in which its
use was not allowed in the past. After Parklane, mutuality is ex-
tinct in the federal courts.50
III. ESTABLISHING THE THREE COROLLARIES
A. Issue Actually Litigated
In attempting to apply collateral estoppel, a litigant must first
establish that the relevant issue was actually litigated in a prior
action.5 1 The party seeking to assert the estoppel has the burden of
proof with respect to this issue. Therefore, the litigant cannot shift
to the judge the burden of reading the prior record on his own
initiative, but must request perusal of that record.52 Although the
pleadings are usually a good source to determine the matters that
were put in issue, occasionally matters are put in issue without ap-
pearing in the pleadings. The party claiming the estoppel may then
examine any part of the record in the prior action, including the
transcript. If there is no record or if the record is incomplete, the
party may also present the testimony of anyone who observed the
trial, including a judge or juror, for the purpose of establishing this
first corollary.53
For example, in Popp v. Eberlein" the plaintiffs, the Popp
family, sought to set aside distraint tax sales by the IRS of six
parcels of their land. Defendants in Popp claimed collateral estop-
pel based upon plaintiffs' loss of an earlier quiet title action
against them. The Popps were not represented by counsel in the
first action, and in response to the claim for collateral estoppel,
they filed an affidavit stating that the first judge had not allowed
them to offer evidence of the invalidity of the sales.
The court reporter for the prior state court proceeding had not
that application of collateral estoppel in this situation would not violate that right. Id. at
333-37.
50. See 48 U. CIN. L. REV. 611, 617 (1979).
51. See notes 9, 10, and 13 supra and accompanying text.
52. United States v. Friedland, 391 F.2d 378, 382 (2d Cir. 1968), a/f'd, 441 F.2d 855
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 914 (1971).
53. F. JAMES & G. HAzARD, supra note 8, at 565, 567. See also Russell v. Place, 94 U.S.
606 (1876)(may show the precise question raised by means of extrinsic evidence outside the
record); Slater v. Skirving, 51 Neb. 108, 70 N.W. 493 (1897)(when the record is uncertain
parol evidence is admissible).
54. 409 F.2d 309 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 909 (1969).
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prepared a transcript and had subsequently lost her notes. Fur-
thermore, the judge for that trial had died. The judge in the later
federal case allowed the Popps, the state court clerk, the court re-
porter, the attorneys, and an IRS agent who had attended the trial
to testify as to what had occurred. The court concluded from the
testimony that, contrary to the allegations in their affidavit, the
Popps had a full and fair opportunity to present and litigate their
claims in the first case and thus were estopped from relitigating
the same issues.55
B. Issue Determined
Once the party asserting estoppel can show that the issue at
hand was litigated previously, he must then establish that the mat-
ter was actually determined.5 Ordinarily, a court will make
specific findings of fact and conclusions of law from which one can
determine the issues that were resolved.57 As long as a court has
jurisdiction, its judgments will be given conclusive effect. Thus, a
state court can observe the judgment of a federal court, and a fed-
eral court that of a state court.
5 8
When there are doubts as to what issues were determined, as
is often the case with a jury's general verdict, a party must resolve
the ambiguity by means of admissible evidence or lose the benefit
of collateral estoppel. In Carte v. McKenzie" plaintiff-lessee had
sued his lessor for locking him out of his dwelling, and the court
had awarded damages. Plaintiff then sued again for conversion of
personal property, but defendant responded that the prior plead-
ings had discussed personalty and that therefore the damages en-
compassed both real and personal property. The findings of fact
and conclusions of law in the first case gave plaintiff the right to
possession of personalty but did not mention damages for conver-
sion. Therefore, the Carte court did not apply collateral estoppel
because the trial judge in the prior action had not stated clearly
what the damages included.
As with the first corollary, a party may use any portion of the
prior record or the testimony of a qualified observer in order to
55. Id. at 310.
56. See notes 9 and 11 supra and accompanying text.
57. F. JAMES & G. HAzARD, supra note 8, at 567.
58. M. GRsEN, supra note 7, at 209; e.g., Vernitron Corp. v. Benjamin, 440 F.2d 105
(2d Cir. 1971); Roth v. McAllister Bros., 316 F.2d 143 (2d Cir. 1963); Shell Oil Co. v. Texas
Gas Transmission Corp., 176 So. 2d 692 (La. Ct. App. 1965).
59. 430 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
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establish that an issue was determined. A party, however, may not
ordinarily demonstrate the second corollary by presenting the tes-
timony of a member of the tribunal-judge or juror. Thus, courts
do not allow inquiries into the process of determination, except to
examine specific findings, such as answers to interrogatories, made
during the prior proceeding.60
Whenever the issues determined in the prior action are subject
to any reasonable doubt, a court will deny the application of collat-
eral estoppel.61 For example, in Duverney v. State62 plaintiff won a
civil rights action in federal district court against a New York po-
lice officer. Subsequently, plaintiff brought an action in a New
York state court for assault and battery, wrongful imprisonment,
and malicious prosecution against the same defendant and another
policeman. The judge, however, denied use of the judgment in the
federal case as a basis for applying the doctrine of collateral estop-
pel in the state action. He cited not only the "inherent differences"
between a federal civil rights claim and a state tort action, but also
the inconsistencies in the jury verdict in the first case. Plaintiffs
had levelled charges at two defendants in the first case, but, with-
out explanation, the jury rendered a verdict against only one de-
fendant. This ambiguity created enough reasonable doubt as to
what was actually determined to disqualify the prior judgment as a
basis for estoppel.63
Any court of competent jurisdiction is entitled to a presump-
tion of regularity, but a party resisting the application of collateral
estoppel may rebut that presumption with evidence of procedural
irregularities. For instance, evidence that a judgment was the prod-
uct of a nonadversary proceeding will render it useless as the basis
for a collateral estoppel claim." Similarly, proof of fraud destroys
the presumption of regularity and fairness connected with a court's
final judgment. 5 The party opposing the use of collateral estoppel
may never simply presume the existence of fraud in the prior ac-
tion, but must prove it with clear and convincing evidence. 6
In the products liability area, courts have imposed a limitation
60. F. JAMEs & G. HAzARD, supra note 8, at 568.
61. See Kauffman v. Moss, 420 F.2d 1270 (3d Cir. 1970); Mulligan v. Schlachter, 389
F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1968).
62. 96 Misc. 2d 898, 410 N.Y.S.2d 237 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
63. Id. at 914-16, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 248-49.
64. Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710, 720 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Metropolitan Dade County, Fla. v. Aerojet-General Corp., 423 U.S. 908 (1975).




on the issues upon which a manufacturer can be estopped. Even
though all of the elements of negligence or strict liabil-
ity-including duty, proximate cause, and damages-were deter-
mined earlier, the plaintiff can assert as a basis for estoppel only
the determination of the defectiveness of the product. Plaintiffs
must prove all the other elements anew in each action.6 7
C. Issue Necessarily Determined
Finally, the party asserting estoppel must demonstrate that
the determination of the relevant issue was a necessary element of
the prior judgment.6 8 In Occidental of Umm Al Qaywayn, Inc. v.
Cities Service Oil Co.6 9 the district judge for the Western District
of Louisiana, in declining to allow collateral estoppel, wrote, "[A]
legal finding may be successfully utilized as collateral estoppel only
when it is evident from the pleadings and the record that the find-
ing was necessary to the final decree and was foreseeably of impor-
tance in possible future litigation. 7 0
In United States v. Barnes7 1 defendant was charged with per-
jury, but claimed that prior general jury verdicts acquitting him
with respect to the same transaction provided him collateral estop-
pel protection from further prosecution. The court held that such a
claim, based on a general jury verdict, required examination of the
prior record including the pleadings, evidence, and jury charge so
as to determine "whether a rational jury could have grounded its
verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to
foreclose from consideration."72 If the jury could have based its de-
cision upon another issue to the exclusion of the one in question,
collateral estoppel will not apply.
As with the mutuality problem, most courts advocate a case-
by-case approach to the question whether an issue was necessarily
determined. For example, when defendants in United States v.
Abatti s filed a motion, based on a previous Tax Court acquittal, to
dismiss a three part indictment, the court stated that it would take
a "practical" rather than a "hypertechnical" approach in determin-
67. Kroll, supra note 12, at 319.
68. See notes 12 and 14 supra and accompanying text.
69. 396 F. Supp. 461 (W.D. La. 1975).
70. Id. at 467.
71. 386 F. Supp. 162 (E.D. Tenn. 1973), afld, 506 F.2d 1400 (6th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 1005 (1975).
72. Id. at 163 (quoting Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 444 (1970)).
73. 463 F. Supp. 596 (S.D. Cal. 1978).
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ing what issues were necessarily determined. 4 Upon examining the
record, the court concluded that the Tax Court had necessarily
based its finding that the taxpayers had not understated their tax-
able income or income tax liability upon a determination that the
taxpayers had no income above what was reported. This conclusion
in turn justified the court's application of collateral estoppel, be-
cause the Tax Court decision was conclusive of all three charges of
the indictment-tax evasion, making false tax returns, and aiding
in the preparation of false tax returns.
D. "Full and Fair Opportunity to Litigate" Standard
The case-by-case analysis coupled with an emphasis on fair-
ness has thus become a major consideration not only in the mutu-
ality question, but also in all aspects of collateral estoppel.75 In
fact, many judges and legal scholars feel that fairness is the ulti-
mate consideration, rather than reliance on any particular set of
rules. Therefore, once the party moving for estoppel has satisfied
the three corollaries, his opponent then has the chance to show
that he did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the rele-
vant issue in the prior action .7 In Schwartz v. Public Administra-
tor77 the party opposing collateral estoppel did not meet his bur-
den when he could not establish any instances of unfairness such
as lack of adequate representation, prejudice due to the forum, tac-
tical advantage by the plaintiff, introduction of any significant new
evidence, excessive sympathy on the part of the first jury, or a
compromise verdict.7 8 Other cases also emphasize such factors as
presence of counsel for the losing party, regularity and adequacy of
the procedures, limits of the jurisdiction of the first courtf7 and
competence and experience of counsel.80 In addition, most courts
employing the "fairness" rule require a strong showing of lack of
74. Id. at 600. See also Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 444 (1970).
75. See notes 30-41 supra and accompanying text.
76. Kroll, supra note 12, at 315.
77. 24 N.Y.2d 65, 246 N.E.2d 725, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1969). The court wrote,
New York law has now reached the point where there are but two necessary require-
ments for the invocation of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. There must be an iden-
tity of issue which has necessarily been decided in the prior action and is decisive of
the present action, and, second, there must have been a full and fair opportunity to
contest the decision now said to be controlling.
Id. at 71, 246 N.E.2d at 729, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 960.
78. Id. at 72, 246 N.E.2d at 729-30, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 961.
79. Read v. Sacco, 49 A.D.2d 471, 474, 375 N.Y.S.2d 371, 375 (1975).




an adequate prior opportunity to litigate.81 The basic policy behind
the "full and fair opportunity to litigate" standard is the encour-
agement of the resolution at a single trial of all claims arising from
the same incident and the resultant saving of time, manpower, and
money.82
IV. DETERMINIG JURY MISCONDUCT
A. Basic Rules
The determination of the exact conclusion reached by a jury,
particularly in the case of jury misconduct, poses many unique
problems in the application of collateral estoppel. Generally, the
existence of any reasonable doubt as to what was decided in a prior
case-including doubt as to what issues a jury actually and neces-
sarily determined-results in a denial of collateral estoppel.as Fur-
thermore, the problem is compounded by the limits that courts
traditionally have placed upon any investigation into the decision-
making process in the jury room."
As a general rule, a party cannot enlist the aid of a juror to
impeach a jury verdict or to inquire into the state of mind of any
jury members during their deliberations.5 This exclusionary prin-
ciple, which exists both at common law and in Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 606(b), 8' is based upon a number of policy justifications.8
Courts first developed the principle in order to protect jurors from
harassment by defeated parties, to prevent inhibition of the delib-
erative process in the jury room, and to forestall a flood of merit-
81. People v. Plevy, 67 A.D.2d 591, 416 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1979).
82. Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 246 N.E.2d 725, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1969).
83. Duverney v. State, 96 Misc. 2d 898, 909, 410 N.Y.S.2d 237, 244 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
84. See generally Mueller, Jurors' Impeachment of Verdicts and Indictments in Fed-
eral Court Under Rule 606(b), 57 Nan. L. Rsv. 920 (1978).
85. King v. United States, 576 F.2d 432, 438 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Di-
oguardi, 492 F.2d 70, 79 (2d Cir. 1974); Heaver v. Ward, 68 IM. App. 3d 236, 240-41, 386
N.E.2d 134, 138 (1979).
86. Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment. Upon an inquiry into the validity
of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occur-
ring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his
or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from
the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith,
except that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial informa-
tion was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence
was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may his affidavit or evidence of
any statement by him concerning a matter about which he would be precluded from
testifying be received for these purposes.
FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
87. See generally Mueller, supra note 84.
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less post-verdict complaints and investigations.s Many courts also
employ the principle to discourage jury tampering, which would be
extremely difficult to discover,89 and to preserve verdict finality
and thus the jury system itself.9 Finally, some courts reason that a
juror's mental process is personal to him and should not be sub-
jected to the test of someone else's testimony.9 1
In the United States two versions of the exclusionary principle
have developed. The "Iowa Rule" excludes evidence of anything
that "essentially inheres in the verdict itself," such as evidence
that a juror did not assent to a verdict, did not understand the
pleadings, testimony, or instructions, was influenced unduly by
other jurors, or was mistaken in his calculation of a judgment. On
the other hand, the "Iowa Rule" allows evidence of so-called "inde-
pendent facts," such as proof that a witness and a juror discussed
the case out of court, that a party, agent, or attorney improperly
approached a juror, or that a jury reached its verdict by quotient
or chance.2 In contrast to the "Iowa Rule," the "federal rule" dis-
tinguishes between the actual effect of extraneous matter upon a
juror's mind and the extraneous matter itself. A court will receive
evidence of the former, but not the latter. Under the "federal rule"
courts have excluded evidence of quotient verdicts, decisions to
comply with a majority vote,93 misunderstanding of instructions,
and misuse of evidence,95 but have received evidence of improper
communication with the bailiff9  or parties97 and the presentation
of unauthorized evidence in the courtroom. 8
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), although substantially simi-
lar to the "federal rule," is in some respects broader. The rule ap-
plies to any inquiry into the invalidity of a verdict or indictment,
88. King v. United States, 576 F.2d 432, 438 (2d Cir. 1978).
89. United States v. Eagle, 539 F.2d 1166, 1170 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1110 (1977); Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140, 148 (3d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 917 (1976); United States v. Howard, 506 F.2d 865, 868-69 n.3 (5th Cir.
1975).
90. Jorgensen v. York Ice Mach. Corp., 160 F.2d 432, 435 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332
U.S. 764 (1947).
91. Heaver v. Ward, 68 Ill. App. 3d 236, 240-41, 386 N.E.2d 134, 138 (1979).
92. See Wright v. Illinois & Miss. Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195 (1866).
93. McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1915).
94. Jorgensen v. York Ice Mach. Corp., 160 F.2d 432, 435 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332
U.S. 764 (1947).
95. Bryson v. United States, 238 F.2d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
817 (1957).
96. Morgan v. Sun Oil Co., 109 F.2d 178, 180 (5th Cir. 1940).
97. Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966).
98. Washington Gas Light Co. v. Connolly, 214 F.2d 254, 257 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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and it operates to bar any testimony of a juror, orally or by affida-
vit, or any proof of his out-of-court statement on a matter as to
which his testimony would be barred. Thus, a court will exclude
evidence of any matter occurring or statement made during delib-
erations, the effect of anything upon any juror's mind or emotions,
or the mental processes of any juror whose testimony is offered."
The only exceptions to Rule 606(b) are evidence of extraneous
prejudicial information and of external influence improperly as-
serted upon the jury.100 Proof of a compromise verdict does not fit
into either exception and is therefore excluded under Rule
606(b). 101
V. THE Katz CASE
A. Facts and Decision
Many of the principles of collateral estoppel and of post-ver-
dict questioning of jurors collided in the New York district court
case of Katz v. Eli Lilly & Co. 1 0 2 In 1975 Benna Katz had brought
the original lawsuit seeking damages of $5,000,000 against Eli Lilly
& Co. as a manufacturer of the drug diethylstilbestrol("DES").
Her complaint alleged that prior to her birth in 1953, a physician
had prescribed DES for her mother, Esta Katz, in order to prevent
miscarriage. When Benna Katz was eighteen her doctor discovered
that she had adenocarcinoma of the vagina, and in 1977 Benna
Katz died. Following her daughter's death, Esta Katz filed a new
complaint as administratrix of her daughter's estate, seeking the
same amount of damages and alleging breach of warranty and neg-
ligence in testing and distributing the drug in 1953.
On July 16, 1979, a New York state court jury, in a similar
action captioned Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 02 returned a verdict
against defendant Lilly in the amount of $500,000. Soon after the
jury returned the Bichler verdict, attorneys for Lilly in the Katz
case approached one of the jurors in Bichler and asked her to dis-
99. Stiles v. Lawrie, 211 F.2d 188, 190 (6th Cir. 1954).
100. FED. R. Evm. 606(b).
101. Poches v. J.J. Newberry Co., 549 F.2d 1166, 1169 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Green, 523 F.2d 229, 234-35 (2d Cir., 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1074 (1976); Castleberry
v. N.R.M. Corp., 470 F.2d 1113, 1116-18 (10th Cir. 1972); Jorgensen v. York Ice Mach.
Corp., 160 F.2d 432 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 764 (1947). See also United States v.
Kohne, 358 F. Supp. 1046, 1048-50 (W.D. Pa.), affd, 487 F.2d 1395 (3d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974).
102. 84 F.R.D. 378 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
103. No. 65534 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Bronx County, July 16, 1979).
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cuss the jury's deliberations.'" Subsequently, she and another ju-
ror made statements suggesting that the jury had reached the
Bichler verdict through compromise; yet when served with a notice
of deposition and subpoena, the first juror telephoned the state
court trial judge to complain of harassment. Plaintiff in Katz then
moved under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 45 for an
order to quash the subpoenas and to vacate the notices.105
In denying plaintiff's motion, the court stated that ordinarily
there would be no question but that the depositions would be
within the broad scope of discovery allowed under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. In this case, however, the intrusion into
the mental processes of the jurors presented a problem. The court,
however, noted that defendant was not seeking to impeach or un-
dercut the finality of the Bichler verdict but rather to question the
extent to which the Bichler judgment should be given collateral
estoppel effect in Katz. Therefore, it concluded that the general
rule that verdicts are unimpeachable'"6 was not applicable to the
present situation. Instead, the court accepted defendant's argu-
ment that several cases, while not directly on point, supported the
proposition that there is no absolute rule against taking jury testi-
mony for the sole purpose of blocking the collateral estoppel effect
of a judgment. 0 7 In addition, the fact that the Katz plaintiff obvi-
ously intended to employ the Bichler verdict in an offensive appli-
cation of collateral estoppel mandated that the court afford Eli
Lilly every reasonable opportunity to examine the verdict sought
to be asserted against it.108 Judge Neaher concluded his opinion as
104. The trial judge in the Bichler case gave the following instruction to the jurors
concerning post-trial discussion:
It's entirely up to you whether you wish to discuss the deliberations with anybody at
all. You are not obligated to. If you do not wish to, please don't hesitate to refrain from
saying anything. However, on the other hand, if it is your desire to talk about the case
to anyone, you are free to do so, as well.
84 F.R.D. at 379.
105. Id. at 379-80.
106. See, e.g., McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1915); Gamell v. Mt. Sinai Hosp., 40
A.D.2d 1010, 339 N.Y.S.2d 31 (1972); Schrader v. Joseph H. Gertner, Jr., Inc., 282 A.D.
1064, 126 N.Y.S.2d 521 (1953); FmD. R. Evm. 606(b).
107. See, e.g., Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1933); Redman v. United States, 77
F.2d 126 (9th Cir. 1935); United States v. Freedland, 111 F. Supp. 852 (D.N.D. 1953); Peo-
ple v. DeLucia, 20 N.Y.2d 275, 229 N.E.2d 211, 282 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1967); Schrader v. Joseph
H. Gertner, Jr., Inc., 282 A.D. 1064, 126 N.Y.S.2d 521 (1953); People ex rel. Nunns v.
County Court, 188 A.D. 424, 176 N.Y.S. 858 (1919).
108. The Katz plaintiff could only use the prior judgment to estop defendant on the
issue whether DES was a defective product. Other elements of liability, such as causation,




Thus, where as here defendant raises a colorable argument that the
Bichler verdict was not the result of a fair and just determination of the
facts, technical nicety is exalted over substantial justice if defendant is pre-
cluded from pursuing discovery of information to make out such a defense, if
any. Accordingly, the court holds that, where through permissible investiga-
tion apart from the compulsion of any court order a party demonstrates a
factual basis for a belief that a judgment asserted against it as collateral es-
toppel was based on a compromise verdict, further inquiry into the facts by
depositions of jurors shown to have information relevant to the issues is war-
ranted under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 10 '
B. Analysis
Judge Neaher correctly observed that the cases upon which
defendant relied were not directly applicable to the Katz case, for
none of them dealt with the denial of the collateral estoppel effect
of a judgment. Instead, all but one of the cases arose out of crimi-
nal contempt proceedings against a juror who allegedly had given
false or misleading answers on voir dire in order to gain admission
to the jury and to aid one side or the other. The courts held that
once a prima facie case of misconduct was presented, a court could
receive evidence from other jurors concerning jury room conduct of
the juror in question.110 These holdings do not violate the rule that
a juror cannot impeach his own verdict, because in a contempt pro-
ceeding there is no attack upon the verdict itself.,,,
The Katz defendant also cited People v. DeLucia,112 which in-
volved jurors who went to the scene of an attempted burglary to
reenact the alleged crime. The court received testimony by the ju-
rors concerning this "inherently prejudicial outside influence" to
impeach the verdict-not as a repudiation of the prohibition
against jurors impeaching their own verdicts, but as an exception
to that prohibition. The court did not require proof of the extent
of the visit's influence on the jurors once that extraneous influence
was established.11
3
109. 84 F.R.D. at 382.
110. See Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1933)(evidence of intentional concealment
overcame juror's privilege of secrecy as to conduct in jury room); Redman v. United States,
77 F.2d 126 (9th Cir. 1935)(when juror charged with contempt, court may consider conduct
during jury deliberations); United States v. Freedland, 111 F. Supp. 852 (D.N.D. 1953)(can
examine jury room conduct when there is evidence of sham juror); Schrader v. Joseph H.
Gertner, Jr., Inc., 282 A.D. 1064, 126 N.Y.S.2d 521 (1953) (juror affidavits received to show
others' misconduct in dealing with jury).
111. People ex rel. Nunns v. County Court, 188 A.D. 424, 176 N.Y.S. 858 (1919).
112. 20 N.Y.2d 275, 229 N.E.2d 211, 282 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1967).
113. Id. The court stated, "[Tihese jurors became unsworn witnesses against the de-
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In Katz there was no attempt to overturn the Bichler verdict
or to obtain a new trial in that case. This consideration, the case
authority allowing the taking of jury testimony in some circum-
stances, and the emphasis on fairness in the application of collat-
eral estoppel provide strong support for the Katz decision.
VI. MUTUALrrY, THE JURY SYSTEM, AND THE Katz APPROACH
A. Katz-A Response
The abrogation of the mutuality requirement has coincided
closely with an increase in mass tort/multiple plaintiff litigation,
such as the "DES daughter," asbestosis, and DC-10 cases. 14 An
increase in the application of offensive collateral estoppel, again
often in actions involving numerous plaintiffs and a single defen-
dant, has accompanied this abandonment of mutuality.1"5 For ex-
ample, in a recent medical malpractice and drug products liability
suit brought by the mother of an infant who had died from the
effects of a vaccination, the Second Circuit held that the plaintiff
could use a 1968 Eighth Circuit case to estop the defendant on the
issue of the inadequacy of the warnings issued with the vaccine.116
Similarly, in 1980 a Texas district court held that the offensive use
of collateral estoppel was appropriate in an asbestosis case. 17
Therefore, because the Fifth Circuit had found in 1973 that asbes-
tos products as manufactured, sold, or distributed by the corporate
defendants were defective and unreasonably dangerous, 18 the
same defendants were now estopped from relitigating whether
their asbestos products were defective and unreasonably
dangerous.111
Courts and commentators have articulated fears concerning
these changes in collateral estoppel analysis ever since the original
implementation of the changes. One such discussion appeared
fendants in direct contravention of their right, under the Sixth Amendment, 'to be con-
fronted with the witnesses' against them." Id. at 279, 229 N.E.2d at 214, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 530
(quoting Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966)).
114. See generally Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CALiF. L. REV. 25
(1965).
115. 48 U. CIN. L. Rzv. 611, 613 (1979).
116. Ezagui v. Dow Chem. Corp., 598 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1979).
117. Mooney v. Fibreboard Corp., 485 F. Supp. 242 (E.D. Tex. 1980). Plaintiff had
worked for thirty years as an insulator handling large quantities of asbestos materials. He
claimed that the exposure to the asbestos had caused serious injury to his lungs and respira-
tory system.
118. Borel v. Fibreboard Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973).
119. 485 F. Supp. 242, 248 (E.D. Tex. 1980).
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twelve years after the Bernhard decision in an article by Professor
Brainerd Currie, who argued that Bernhard should not be applied
to multiple plaintiff cases.120 Using the illustration of a train acci-
dent from which fifty personal injury actions arise, he set forth a
variety of situations in which strict application of the Bernhard
doctrine would produce anomalous results. For example, he raised
the possibility of the first twenty-five plaintiffs losing their cases
against the railroad; the twenty-sixth, however, wins a case, and
the next twenty-four plaintiffs successfully use that one victorious
judgment as collateral estoppel against the defendant.1 21 Currie
bolstered his argument by noting that the twenty-sixth plaintiff
may have won simply because the forum was inconvenient for the
defendant, because unusual circumstances promoted sympathy for
the plaintiff, or even because of a compromise verdict.
1 22
Currie also discussed the distinction between offensive and de-
fensive assertion of collateral estoppel. He employed a series of
diagrams to demonstrate that whether collateral estoppel is as-
serted only by the defendant or by either party but only against a
prior aggressor, the plea should be allowed in a Bernhard situation
but not in the train wreck (multiple plaintiff) situation.123 In a
later article, however, Currie abandoned his multiple plaintiff "rule
of thumb" because the anticipated broad application of Bernhard
never really materialized. Currie concluded that most courts, hav-
ing turned to the "full and fair opportunity to litigate" standard,
carefully examined the facts of each case before applying collateral
estoppel instead of engaging in "easy and cynical generali-
zation.", 2'
The Supreme Court has continued the trend observed by Cur-
rie in other courts. As recently as the Parklane decision, the Court
discussed with some concern the problems peculiar to the offensive
use of collateral estoppel.12 5 The Court, however, refused to pre-
120. Currie, supra note 26. Currie also argued that the Bernhard doctrine should not
be applied when the party to be estopped lacked the initiative in the first action. Subse-
quently, Currie modified this position to an emphasis on whether or not the party had a full
and fair opportunity to litigate. See Currie, supra note 114, at 27-32. See also Currie, supra
note 26.
121. Currie, supra note 26, at 286.
122. Id. at 288. For a discussion of the effect of evidence of a compromise verdict on
the judicial decision to grant a new trial, see Leipert v. Honold, 39 Cal. 2d 462, 247 P.2d 324
(1952).
123. Currie, supra note 26, at 292-93.
124. Currie, supra note 114, at 32-37.
125. See text accompanying notes 46-50 supra.
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clude the use of offensive collateral estoppel, opting instead to
grant trial courts broad discretion to determine when estoppel
should apply.
126
The concerns about the abrogation of the mutuality require-
ment and the growing use of offensive collateral estoppel are com-
pounded by what many see as the inherent flaws of the jury sys-
tem. In fact, a major argument in support of a continued
requirement of mutuality is the fallibility of the jury system. For
instance, in Spettigue v. Mahoney,2 " an offensive collateral estop-
pel case, the Arizona Court of Appeals criticized the abrogation of
mutuality by pointing out that many variable factors, including the
selection and personality of the jury, diminish the reliability and
accuracy of the trial process. The court stated:
While this court believes that our system of justice has no peer in this
fallible world, nevertheless, it is unable to consider that our trial processes
unerringly discover Truth. The selection of the judge and jury, the choice of
counsel, the availability of witnesses, the manner of the presentation of their
testimony, the dynamics of the rapport between witnesses and fact-finder,
and the personalities and appearances of the parties as they impress the fact-
finder ... variously determine the outcome of a contest conducted in the
courts of this country.
[1]n one action a jury can proclaim one fact as verity and in a subsequent
action a different jury can proclaim the opposite.12'
In a similar vein, Professor Currie originally stated that his reluc-
tance to extend the Bernhard doctrine to multiple plaintiff cases
stemmed partly from a distrust of the jury, particularly its ten-
dency to compromise the liability issue.
12
9
The Minnesota Schwartz hearing exemplifies an attempt to
deal with the flaws in the jury system. The hearing, which is
designed to uncover jury misconduct while protecting jurors from
harassment by parties out of court, involves questioning of jurors
by the trial court while they are under oath. The questioning is on
the record and in the presence of counsel.13 0
126. 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979).
127. 8 Ariz. App. 281, 445 P.2d 557 (1968).
128. Id. at 286, 445 P.2d at 562.
129. Currie, supra note 26, at 321. Currie suggests that perhaps jury cases should
somehow be treated differently from other cases.
130. The Schwartz hearing is so named because it was first used in a Minnesota case
styled Schwartz v. Minneapolis Suburban Bus Co., 258 Minn. 325, 104 N.W.2d 301 (1960).
In the Minnesota case of Quinn v. Winkel's, Inc., 279 N.W.2d 65 (Minn. 1979), the defen-
dant bar owner, found liable for plaintiff's injuries sustained when shot by an assailant in
the bar, argued that the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's request for a
Schwartz hearing. The Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that such hearings were to be liber-
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Judge Neaher's approach in Katz is simply a response to these
often voiced criticisms concerning the combined effect of nonmutu-
ality, offensive collateral estoppel, and a fallible jury system. Katz
involved each of these elements. Because the Katz court did not
require mutuality, Mrs. Katz's nonparty status in the Bichler suit
did not preclude her from asserting collateral estoppel. Further-
more, because the court allowed offensive collateral estoppel her
status as plaintiff did not preclude her from utilizing the estoppel
doctrine. In the earlier suit, however, there was some evidence of a
compromise verdict-the very possibility that Currie and others
have found so troubling. In the exercise of its broad discretion, the
court simply decided that more should be known about the Bichler
verdict before allowing the offensive application of collateral estop-
pel in a nonmutual situation. In this situation, the couit held that
deposing jurors was the appropriate method for the defendant to
disprove the establishment of the collateral estoppel corollaries.
Absent this type of approach, the court obviously felt that the
combination of nonmutuality and offensive collateral estoppel
would place defendants at the mercy of any potential plaintiff in a
multiple plaintiff case once a court reached a judgment unfavora-
ble to the defendant.13 1 In addition, the decision operates as a
check on juries and attempts to prevent the repetition of injus-
tices. Katz therefore typifies one of the major features of the col-
lateral estoppel doctrine--its flexibility.132 This flexibility is ex-
tremely significant because collateral estoppel, even more so than
res judicata, can be "an extraordinarily dangerous instrument"
when overextended. 
3
B. Arguments Against Katz
1. The Sufficiency of Present Collateral Estoppel Application
Despite the potential for abuse of collateral estoppel-a po-
tential that prompted the taking of juror depositions in Katz-one
ally granted once the moving party sufficiently alleged facts suggesting jury misconduct. In
Zimmerman v. Witte Transp. Sys., 259 N.W.2d 260 (Minn. 1977), the Minnesota Supreme
Court also stated that in connection with a Schwartz hearing neither an attorney nor his
agents could initiate questioning of jurors; they could, however, question jurors who first
came to them to report possible misconduct.
131. See 84 F.R.D. at 381-82.
132. See Hossler v. Barry, 403 A.2d 762 (Me. 1979).
133. "Over and over again it has been demonstrated that [collateral estoppel's] exten-
sion by merely logical processes of manipulation may produce results which are abhorrent to
the sense of justice and to orderly law administration." Currie, supra note 26, at 289.
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could argue that the safeguards that have developed in the appli-
cation of the doctrine are fully sufficient to protect against most, if
not all, such abuses. As Professor Currie observed several years af-
ter his initial article on the subject, generally courts do not allow
collateral estoppel to be asserted by any and all nonparties in an
indiscriminate manner.13 4 Through the widespread use of the "full
and fair opportunity to litigate" standard, courts are carefully
scrutinizing the facts of the prior case and comparing them to the
current litigation in an effort to avoid anomalous results.
In addition, any indications of a compromise verdict that
would -prompt the deposing of jurors would usually also prompt
the court to deny application of collateral estoppel because of the
concomitant reasonable doubt 3 5 concerning the sufficiency of the
prior judgment. For example, the attorneys for Eli Lilly in Katz
could have argued that the statements made by the two jurors pro-
vided enough evidence of a deficiency in the Bichler judgment to
block its use as the basis for a collateral estoppel plea. Thus, the
court could have reached the same result without venturing into
the uncharted territory of deposing jurors in order to determine
the preclusive effect of a judgment.
2. Inquiry into Juror's State of Mind
By distinguishing between inquiries into jury deliberations for
the purpose of impeaching a jury verdict and inquiries for some
other purpose, 38 Judge Neaher ignored the fact that many courts
are reluctant to inquire into the state of mind of a juror for any
purpose.137 Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), however, does deal
only with the use of jurors' testimony to establish the invalidity of
a verdict. Thus, it appears that Judge Neaher's ordering of juror
depositions was within the limit of applicable law. Nevertheless,
because of the lack of direct authoritative law and the inherent
need for secrecy associated with jury deliberations, courts should
exercise extreme caution before allowing inquiries into such delib-
erations for any reason.
134. See text accompanying note 137 infra.
135. See notes 61-63 supra and accompanying text.
136. See text accompanying notes 106-09 supra.
137. King v. United States, 576 F.2d 432, 438 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Di-




3. Negative Effect on Attitude toward Jury System
One of the historical policies behind the establishment of a
jury system was not the belief that the jury was a particularly effi-
cient method of administering justice, but rather that it was im-
portant that a person be judged by a group of laymen. A major role
of the jury has always been to bring an element of common sense
and community sensibility into the courtroom. 38 Consequently,
judges and lawyers repeatedly impress upon jurors the significance
of their responsibilities and of their decisionmaking processes.
A willingness to depose jurors concerning their deliberations in
the jury room, if allowed to occur very frequently, could frustrate
this policy of community participation in the legal system by af-
fecting the attitudes of jurors toward their roles as decisionmakers.
For example, if courts frequently, or even occasionally, require ju-
rors to submit to discovery about matters occurring in the jury
room, those jurors and potential jurors may begin to feel that their
ability and authority to decide an issue is really negligible in our
legal system. Whenever lawyers and judges can enter into the de-
liberative processes of a jury, this intrusion diminishes the jury's
role as an independent voice of the community in judicial
administration.
C. Problems Raised by Katz
Even more troublesome than the direct arguments waged
against the result in Katz are the many unanswered questions that
the case raises concerning the possible variations on the Katz fact
pattern. For example, in Katz notice of deposition and subpoena
were only served on two jurors. Although the court did not address
the issue, it may be preferable to require that, if a party deposes
at least one juror about jury deliberations, he must also depose all
the others. Otherwise, there is always the possibility that the other
jurors have completely different stories that would remain untold.
In an analogous California case, Johns v. City of Los Angeles,13 9 a
single juror charged in an affidavit that another juror had made
racially offensive statements concerning the black plaintiffs. Every
other juror, however, emphatically denied that the accused juror
ever made the statements. The appellate court held that the trial
judge's.acceptance of the one accusatory statement and his rejec-
138. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 344 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting).
139. 78 Cal. App. 3d 983, 144 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1978).
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tion of the rest for no apparent reason constituted an abuse of dis-
cretion. The Katz opinion, on the other hand, does not deal with
the potential problems arising from the knowledge of only two out
of twelve jurors' statements about the existence of a compromise
verdict. Similarly, the case does not provide any guidelines for
handling a situation in which depositions are taken of all the ju-
rors, but members of the group disagree as to how they reached
their decision in the prior action. In addition, the intervening
death of one or more of the jurors may taint the validity and relia-
bility of the remaining jurors' statements.
Deposing jurors in order to defend against the offensive appli-
cation of collateral estoppel, rather than to impeach the prior ver-
dict, seems at first glance to be a just and simple method of exam-
ining a prior judgment. If courts were to move in this direction,
however, some of the hypothetical situations discussed above
would soon arise. Eventually a judge would have to decide whether
depositions of only a few of the jury members, a majority of the
jury members, or all of the jury members would suffice. This ques-
tion would be particularly relevant if a juror came forward on his
own to refute testimony given by other jurors. Assuming the court
generally wants the depositions of all the jurors, it must then de-
cide whether to take any depositions when some jurors are dead,
unavailable, or in disagreement with one another. At that point the
potential for confusion and unjust results may negate the policy of
fairness underlying Katz.
A related problem occurs if a juror should absolutely refuse to
acquiesce in discovery. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 contains
a system for sanctioning people who refuse to comply with discov-
ery requests. For example, the party seeking discovery may apply
for a court order compelling compliance. A court, however, may
deny the motion and even issue a protective order for the person
seeking to avoid discovery in order to guard against disclosure of
privileged matter and to prevent harassment.140 Courts generally
have been reluctant to order the more drastic sanctions, except in
the most outrageous situations."" Therefore, a court may be will-
ing to authorize a notice of deposition in order to determine the
soundness of a judgment as a basis for collateral estoppel, but be
unwilling to impose strict penalties on a juror who claims in good
faith that the jury room deliberations are privileged. Of course the
140. FD. R. Civ. PRoc. 37(a)(2).
141. F. JAMES, CrviL PROCEDURE § 6.13 (1965).
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imposition of sanctions for the refusal to comply with discovery
could lead eventually to litigation that would resolve more defi-
nitely the extent of a juror's privilege in refusing to disclose any
part of the jury deliberations.
Another problem raised by the Katz decision is the extent of
its holding. Katz involves a situation in which a plaintiff asserted
offensive application of collateral estoppel, but it is not clear
whether the holding of the case should be limited to offensive use.
The approach in Katz does present a problem handling the reverse
situation-an attempt by Eli Lilly to use a prior favorable judg-
ment defensively to estop a subsequent plaintiff. Should the plain-
tiff be allowed the same opportunity to examine the jury's deci-
sionmaking process in the prior litigation? The language in the
opinion emphasizes the context of offensive application of collat-
eral estoppel:
Moreover, where as in this case plaintiff clearly intends to rely on "offen-
sive" use of collateral estoppel, fundamental notions of fairness require that
Lilly be afforded every reasonable opportunity to explore the factual basis for
a claim that the judgment asserted as binding on it should not be accorded
such an effect because based on a compromise verdict.'
4
2
Such language strongly suggests that the holding would not apply
to defensive use cases. The Parklane decision also discusses the
unique features and dangers of offensive collateral estoppel. 143 The
absence of those dangers would probably swing the balance toward
preservation of the confidentiality of jury room deliberations in the
defensive situation.
It may be desirable to limit the Katz holding not only to of-
fensive use in general, but also to offensive use in mass tort cases.
Certainly the mass tort/multiple plaintiff cases magnify the prob-
lems of offensive use, as Currie illustrated in his famous railroad
hypothetical. 44 Allowing depositions of jurors in that successful
twenty-sixth case would provide more information from which to
determine whether that judgment should be used as the basis for a
collateral estoppel plea by the next twenty-four plaintiffs. Yet, as
Currie eventually concluded, courts have been thoughtfully apply-
ing collateral estoppel by using the "full and fair opportunity to
litigate" standard,1 4 5 so that it seems unnecessary to depose ju-
rors-especially considering the many problems that such an ap-
142. 84 F.RD. at 381-82.
143. See text accompanying notes 45-48 supra.
144. See text accompanying notes 120-22 supra.




A related question is whether the Katz decision applies only to
compromise verdicts. The holding sentence in the final paragraph
of the opinion speaks only of allowing depositions when "a party
demonstrates a factual basis for a belief that a judgment asserted
against it as collateral estoppel was based on a compromise verdict
.... ,146 On the other hand, if a prior judgment is invalid as the
basis for a collateral estoppel plea because it is based upon a com-
promise verdict, then it should be equally invalid due to inade-
quate representation in the first case, prejudice because of the fo-
rum, fraud, or some other kind of jury misconduct.147 A defendant
could readily use Katz to argue for engaging in discovery whenever
there are indications of any of these problems. In fact, signs of any
of the factors used in a "full and fair opportunity to litigate" anal-
ysis could become grounds for exploring the first case by means of
juror depositions. Again, such a result would be an overreaction to
the potential dangers of collateral estoppel. If a party can demon-
strate a "factual basis for a belief that a judgment asserted against
it as collateral estoppel was based on a compromise verdict" or on
some other flaw, then that demonstration ordinarily will be suffi-
cient to block the application of collateral estoppel.
Finally, is Katz limited only to obtaining jurors' testimony, or
could a court use it to justify taking the depositions of judges and
lawyers in prior cases? Usually in situations in which the record of
the first trial is either incomplete or nonexistent, one can question
a judge, juror, lawyer, or any observer to determine what issues
were actually litigated,148 but one may not do so to ascertain what
issues were determined.1 49 Katz, however, expands the situations
in which jurors may be questioned, and its rationale could poten-
tially do the same for judges and lawyers. In Dodge v. Carri-Craft,
Inc.150 a Wisconsin district court refused to consider a letter, writ-
ten by a state court judge to defense counsel stating that a prior
action had been dismissed without prejudice, in determining
whether a subsequent federal action was barred by res judicata.
The result, however, may be different in a case involving collateral
estoppel because of the changes in the analysis of collateral estop-
pel and the greater degree of flexibility allowed in its application.
146. 84 F.R.D. at 382.
147. See text accompanying notes 65, 75-82 supra.
148. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
149. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
150. 332 F. Supp. 651 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
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Furthermore, certain jury related problems-such as disagreement
among jurors-would not exist when deposing a single judge. Such
problems, however, would arise if the prior case was tried in a
three judge district court. The potential for harassment would also
arise if courts allowed more freedom to question judges about their
decisions.
Unique problems accompany an extension of Katz to the de-
posing of lawyers. A trial attorney's role as an advocate' 5 ' in an
adversary proceeding would probably tend to render suspect his
conclusions as to what issues were determined. In addition, the at-
torney is not a part of the tribunal-as is a judge or juror-and is
not privy to the actual issues that resulted in a verdict. Therefore,
there is little to be gained by deposing lawyers concerning the sec-
ond and third corollaries, while the same possibility for harassment
remains. In fact, the use of lawyers' testimony in prior cases to
determine the validity of a judgment as the basis for a collateral
estoppel plea would increase the possibility of getting a skewed ac-
count of the events that occurred.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although Katz v. Eli Lilly is only a single district court deci-
sion, it represents a very significant and natural result of the
changes occurring in the collateral estoppel doctrine. The decision,
however, may be an overreaction to the problems generated by
those changes. The very circumstances that raise the question
whether to depose jurors often dictate that collateral estoppel not
be allowed. A situation could arise in which the indications of some
flaw in the prior judgment are so slight as to fail to bar application
of collateral estoppel, yet the ramifications of inadvertently basing
a decision on a flawed judgment are so great that they warrant tak-
ing the depositions of jurors in the prior action. Katz may very
well be such a case. In future cases, however, judges should guard
against freely allowing depositions of jurors when the circum-
stances already create enough reasonable doubt about a judgment
to prevent it from serving as the basis for the application of collat-
eral estoppel.
INA RUTH BIGHAM
151. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 7.
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